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Extremist Attitudes
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1 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2 Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience
Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Research into the roots of ideological extremism has traditionally focused on the
social, economic, and demographic factors that make people vulnerable to adopting
hostile attitudes toward outgroups. However, there is insufficient empirical work on
individual differences in implicit cognition and information processing styles that amplify
an individual’s susceptibility to endorsing violence to protect an ideological cause or
group. Here we present original evidence that objectively assessed cognitive inflexibility
predicts extremist attitudes, including a willingness to harm others, and sacrifice
one’s life for the group. Across two samples (N = 1,047) from the United Kingdom
and United States, structural equation models demonstrated that cognitive inflexibility
predicted endorsement of violence to protect the national ingroup, which in turn
predicted a willingness to die for the group. These statistical models accounted for an
average of 31.4% of the variance in willingness to die for the group, after accounting
for demographic variables. Furthermore, cognitive inflexibility was related to greater
confidence in the decision to sacrifice one’s life in an ingroup trolley problem scenario.
Analysis of participants’ performance on the cognitive tasks revealed that cognitive
rigidity – distinctly from other aspects of cognition – was specifically implicated as a
cognitive antecedent of extremist attitudes. Implications for the study of radicalization
and identity fusion through a neurocognitive lens are discussed.
Keywords: ideology, cognitive flexibility, extremism, intergroup attitudes, identity fusion
INTRODUCTION
Psychologists have sought to identify the psychological underpinnings of authoritarianism,
ethnocentrism, and xenophobia since the beginning of the 20th century. One prominent
hypothesis developed in the 1940s proposed that ideological rigidity is rooted in mental
rigidity. Specifically, it was suggested that “one of the characteristics of ethnocentric thinking
is a rigidity and inflexibility of the thinking process” (Rokeach, 1948, p. 259) and “general
rigidity and intolerance. . .serve as primary sources of the specific phenomena in the prejudice
area” (Hartley, 1946). This hypothesis emerges from the notion that extreme group identities
and ideologies are often characterized by a tendency to categorize the world and people in
an inflexible and essentialist manner (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer, 1999). Consequently,
individuals with a more categorical, inflexible thinking style may tend to adhere to ideologies
in a stricter or more extreme fashion. Adorno and colleagues’ (Adorno et al., 1950) pivotal
book, The Authoritarian Personality, further developed these ideas by providing empirical support
to the hypothesis that prejudice is tightly linked to rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity.
Indeed, Else Frenkel-Brunswick (one of the authors of The Authoritarian Personality) already
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noted in 1949 that children who scored highly on prejudice
measures exhibited greater rigidity on arithmetic and perceptual
tasks than children who scored low on prejudice. The hypothesis
that ideological rigidity originates from psychological rigidity
thus sparked a rich line of research in political psychology,
under the assumption – well-articulated by Gordon Allport
in The Nature of Prejudice – that “the style of thinking
that is characteristic of prejudice is a reflection, by and
large, of the prejudiced person’s way of thinking about
anything” (Allport, 1954, p. 400; emphasis in original; cited in
Roets and Van Hiel, 2011).
While the original inflexibility hypothesis was primarily
concerned with ethnocentrism and intolerance, modern
political psychology has focused on the relationship between
psychological rigidity and politically right-wing attitudes (Jost
et al., 2003; Van Hiel et al., 2010, 2016), rather than with
ideological intergroup attitudes more generally. Nonetheless,
ideological commitment can be evident in one’s nationalistic
attachment (Mummendey et al., 2001; Zmigrod et al., 2018a),
religious doctrine (Besta et al., 2014; Fredman et al., 2017),
political attitudes (Jost, 2017), or even deep loyalty to a
sports team (Xiao and Van Bavel, 2012). Such ideological
attachments can often motivate individuals to endorse the
pursuit of hostile actions against those that appear to threaten
the group and its unifying cause. This is evident in religious
fundamentalism, xenophobic political groups, and football
hooliganism. Ideological extremism consists of “the justification
of intergroup violence and demand for sacrifice in defense of
the group” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008), and so it is
possible to investigate its precursors in the general population
by assessing individuals’ willingness to fight and sacrifice for an
ideological ingroup.
Notably, there has been little integration of the inflexibility
hypothesis into the modern understanding of extremist behavior.
While a rich literature has emerged on the role of interpersonal
and identity processes in shaping support for extreme pro-group
actions (Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2017; Swann et al., 2014, 2015),
the possible cognitive antecedents of extremist attitudes are still
not well understood. Several key questions are yet to be answered.
For instance, how do information processing and attentional
styles shape individuals’ susceptibility to adopting extremist
beliefs? Do changes in cognitive processing result in altered
evaluation of socio-political arguments? And does engagement
with an extremist ideology lead to changes in general cognition?
While the role of cognitive processes in extremism has
been overlooked, the contribution of psychological motivations
has been discussed at length. The distinction is important:
cognition refers to how information is attended to, processed,
and evaluated, whereas motivation reflects the contributions of
reward and punishment to individuals’ initiation, persistence,
and termination of particular behaviors. One theoretical
framework that has explored the psychological motivations
behind radicalization is significance quest theory (SQT;
Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2013, 2014,
2017). SQT posits that extreme behaviors reflect means of
obtaining or restoring an individual’s experience of personal
significance and efficacy (Webber et al., 2017). Experiencing a
loss of significance due to personal or collective humiliation
can therefore catalyze individuals to adopt extreme ideologies
that offer clear means of restoring meaning and motivational
focus. In particular, Kruglanski and colleagues have identified
need for cognitive closure (NCC), a motivational state in which
individuals seek unambiguous and absolute answers, as a
mediator between loss of significance and extremism (Webber
et al., 2017). Dispositional high need for cognitive closure also
predicts outgroup discrimination (Brizi et al., 2016), prejudice
(Van Hiel et al., 2004; Roets and Van Hiel, 2006, 2011; Onraet
et al., 2011), implicit racism (Cunningham et al., 2004), and
religious fundamentalism (Brandt and Reyna, 2010).
Webster and Kruglanski (1997) noted the differences between
NCC and the rigidity constructs discussed in the early theories
of Rokeach (1948), Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), and others. As
Webster and Kruglanski point out, NCC and rigidity are similar
in their “tendency to be rejecting and impervious in regard to new
ideas or experiences” (Webster and Kruglanski, 1997, p. 138) but
differ in that the early theorists focused on “cognitive rather than
motivational” (Webster and Kruglanski, 1997, p. 138) processes.
The present investigation thereby re-focuses the empirical lens
back to cognitive traits, rather than the motivational processes
discussed by Kruglanski and colleagues, and operationalizes them
through the modern methodologies of cognitive psychology.
The current study had three objectives. Firstly, it aimed to test
the original hypothesis of a link between cognitive inflexibility
and rigid ingroup mentality using objective, behavioral measures
of cognitive flexibility. This is particularly important given that a
majority of studies rely on self-reported measures of inflexibility,
and Van Hiel et al. (2016) recent found that operationalizing
cognitive style using self-report measures rather than behavioral
assessments can inflate effect sizes. Cognitive inflexibility is
defined as the inability to switch between modes of thinking
and hence a difficulty to adapt to changing rules or categories
(Cools and Robbins, 2004). Cognitive flexibility was objectively
assessed using three validated cognitive tasks that tap into
implicit cognitive tendencies to categorize information and rules
in a flexible vs. more rigid fashion: the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST), Remote Associates Test (RAT), and Alternative
Uses Test (AUT, in Study 2 only). The classic WCST (Grant
and Berg, 1948) measures how easily individuals adapt to
changes in newly learnt rules and reward contingencies and
the extent to which individuals can switch between categories
when it is disadvantageous to persist with a previously rewarded
category. High scores indicate a flexible cognitive processing
style. The RAT (Mednick, 1968) measures individuals’ ability
to generate semantic connections between remote concepts. For
instance, participants are shown three remotely connected words
(e.g., worm, shelf, and end) and asked to find the compound
word that links them (e.g., book). The RAT therefore indicates
the extent to which participants’ semantic networks tend to
categorize concepts more loosely – which would aid detection
of remote conceptual connections – or rigidly, which would
render such retrieval challenging (Zmigrod and Zmigrod, 2016).
The AUT (Guilford, 1967) requires that participants provide
as many conventional and unconventional uses to common
objects, such as a brick or a hairpin, and thereby assesses
four cognitive dimensions, including flexibility. Flexibility is
quantified as the number of distinct conceptual categories into
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which a participant’s set of responses can be divided. It has been
used as a measure of cognitive flexibility in multiple behavioral
and neuroimaging studies (e.g., Roberts et al., 2017; Zmigrod
et al., 2018b, 2019).
The second aim was to test the hypothesis that cognitive
inflexibility is related to ideological thinking in the context
of extremist attitudes, as operationalized by a willingness to
fight, and die for the national ingroup (Swann et al., 2010,
2012; Fredman et al., 2015). This differs from past attempts to
relate cognitive flexibility, cognitive ability, or need for cognitive
closure to right-wing attitudes or general prejudice (e.g., Sidanius,
1985; Jost et al., 2003; Van Hiel et al., 2010, 2016; Roets and
Van Hiel, 2011; Hodson and Busseri, 2012; Dhont and Hodson,
2014). Examining the relationship between cognitive inflexibility
and extremist intergroup attitudes therefore constitutes a novel
addition to the literature.
Thirdly, the study tested whether the relationship between
cognitive rigidity and ideological attachment ultimately predicts
willingness to sacrifice one’s life to protect the national ingroup.
Recent research has demonstrated that close attachment and tight
relational ties to a group promote individuals’ willingness to
self-sacrifice on behalf of the group (Swann et al., 2009, 2015).
Consequently, willingness to fight for the group was treated as a
separate, antecedent construct to willingness to die for the group.
To the best of our knowledge, the role of cognitive styles in such
self-sacrificing tendencies has not been empirically studied.
STUDY 1 – UNITED KINGDOM SAMPLE
Introduction
Building on the theoretical and empirical work outlined above,
three specific hypotheses guided Study 1:
H1: Cognitive inflexibility is related to heightened
willingness to fight for one’s ingroup against outgroups.
H2: Cognitive inflexibility predicts willingness to sacrifice
oneself in favor of one’s ingroup through its effect
on ideological attachment, i.e., willingness to fight
for one’s ingroup.
H3: Cognitive inflexibility predicts greater ideological
conviction in one’s willingness to sacrifice oneself in
favor of the ingroup.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
We sought to recruit 286 participants via Prolific Academic
to achieve greater than 80% power to detect a medium effect
of r = 0.20 (according to a meta-analysis by Gignac and
Szodorai (2016) at α = 0.01 in our primary analyses of
correlations between the cognitive variables and the endorsement
of extreme pro-group actions, calculated using the pwr package
in R (Champely et al., 2018). We oversampled by 7% and
recruited 305 participants, 1 of which was excluded due to
providing incomplete responses, yielding a total sample of 304
participants. Participants were redirected from Prolific Academic
to an online survey hosted by Qualtrics Survey Software for
completion of all the self-reported items and the RAT, and
later redirected again to Inquisit 5 by Millisecond Software
in order to temporarily download software that allows for
accurate measure of performance and reaction times in the
WCST. Participants were asked about demographic variables
such as age, ethnicity, gender, and educational attainment.
In the United Kingdom sample, the average age was 38.02
(SD = 13.51, range = 18–72), and 47.0% of participants were
female (see Supplementary Table S1 for additional demographic
characteristics). The research was conducted with the ethical
approval of Cambridge University’s Department of Psychology
Research Ethics Committee.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
The WCST (Grant and Berg, 1948) was administered with
Inquisit 5 by Millisecond Software in standard fashion (Heaton,
1981). Participants are presented with four key cards and a deck
of response cards that vary on three dimensions (color, shape,
and number of geometric figures) and are asked to match a
fifth card from the sequentially presented response cards to one
of the four key cards. Participants need to identify the correct
classification rule (out of three potential rules: matching by color,
shape, or number) according to the feedback they receive after
each trial. They are informed that the classification rule may
change without warning, and indeed the rule alternates after
participants correctly respond to ten consecutive trials, requiring
a flexible set shift. The task ends after participants complete six
categories (twice for each of the three rules) or after 128 trials. To
index participants’ performance, the accuracy rate was computed.
Remote Associates Test (RAT)
The RAT (Mednick, 1968) consisted of 20 compound remote
associate problems, in which participants are presented with
three cue words (e.g., cottage, swiss, and cake), and must
generate the compound word solution that connects these three
words (e.g., cheese). Items of varying difficulty levels were
selected from established remote associate problems (Bowden
and Jung-Beeman, 2003). Participants were given 20 seconds to
respond to each item.
Willingness to Fight for the Group
Willingness to fight for the group was measured using Swann
and colleagues’ validated 5-item measure (Cronbach’s α = 0.82):
(a) “I would fight someone physically threatening another British
person,” (b) “I would fight someone insulting or making fun
of the United Kingdom as a whole,” (c) “I would help others
get revenge on someone who insulted the United Kingdom,”
(d) “Hurting other people is acceptable if it means protecting
the United Kingdom,” and (e) “I’d do anything to protect the
United Kingdom.” All items were presented on a 7-point scale
ranging from totally disagree to totally agree.
Willingness to Die for the Group
Willingness to die for the group was measured using Swann et al.
(2010) item presented on a 7- point scale ranging from totally
disagree to totally agree: “I would sacrifice my life if it saved
another group member’s life.”
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Trolley Problem – Willingness to Jump to One’s Death
to Save the Group
Participants were presented with the following variation of the
footbridge dilemma, inspired by that presented by Swann et al.
(2010): “Imagine that a runaway trolley is about to crush and kill 5
British people. You have the opportunity to jump from a bridge into
the trolley’s path and save all 5 British people. Would you: (a) let
the trolley crush the 5 British people and save your own life, OR (b)
save the 5 British people and sacrifice your own life?” Participants
were then asked to choose between the two options.
In this sample, after indicating whether they would either
sacrifice themselves for the 5 fellow ingroup members or save
their own life by letting the trolley crush and kill the 5 ingroup
members, they were asked to indicate on a scale of 1–100 their
certainty that they would behave as they originally indicated.
Specifically, they were asked: “How certain are you that you
would let the trolley crush the 5 British people and save your own
life/save the 5 British people and sacrifice your own life?”
Results
H1: Is Cognitive Inflexibility Correlated With Extremist
Attitudes?
Performance on the WCST and RAT was analyzed in relation to
individuals’ support for extreme pro-group actions. Correlational
analysis revealed significant negative correlations between
willingness to fight and kill outgroup members to protect the
ingroup and cognitive flexibility across both tasks (Table 1).
H2: Does Cognitive Inflexibility Predict Violence
Endorsement Against Outgroups and Self-Sacrificial
Tendencies?
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of how
cognitive flexibility contributes to extremist attitudes, we
specified a type of structural equation model called “path
models.” This allowed us to examine the extent to which
TABLE 1 | Pearson’s correlations between cognitive flexibility measures and
ideological attitudes across the two samples.
RAT accuracy
rate
WCST
accuracy rate
AUT flexibility
score
Willingness to fight
for the group
United Kingdom
sample
r = −0.241∗∗∗
p < 0.001
r = −0.216∗∗
p = 0.002
−
United States sample r = −0.231∗∗∗
p < 0.001
r = −0.133∗
p = 0.010
r = −0.200∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Willingness to die
for the group
United Kingdom
sample
r = −0.207∗∗∗
p = 0.001
r = −0.039
p = 0.587
–
United States sample r = −0.073
p = 0.069
r = −0.005
p = 0.917
r = −0.084∗
p = 0.026
Identity fusion
United States sample r = −0.101∗
p = 0.010
r = −0.031
p = 0.531
r = −0.049
p = 0.191
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
cognitive inflexibility predicts willingness to fight for the group
and whether this in turn predicts willingness to die for the
group. We used the R package Lavaan (Rosseel, 2012, 2017)
to compute these models. A three-level model was fitted
to the data, in which Level 1 included the two cognitive
flexibility measures (WCST and RAT), Level 2 consisted of
willingness to kill and fight for the group, and Level 3 reflected
individuals’ willingness to sacrifice themselves for their national
group. In this model specification, the cognitive flexibility
measures in Level 1 directly predicted the variables in Level
2, which in turn predicted the self-sacrificial attitudes in Level
3. Residual covariances were allowed within, but not between,
levels. All analyses controlled for age, gender, and educational
attainment, and residual covariances were allowed between these
demographic variables.
We first tested a model in which willingness to self-sacrifice
for the group (Level 3) was directly predicted by the willingness
to fight for the group in Level 2 as well as the cognitive
flexibility variables in Level 1. This model had good fit to the
data (χ2 = 17.692, df = 6, p = 0.007, n = 304, RMSEA = 0.080
[0.040, 0.123], SRMR = 0.024, CFI = 0.920, Yuan-Bentler scaling
correction factor = 1.075). This model, in which all pathways
between the cognitive flexibility measures and willingness to
self-sacrifice were estimated freely, was compared to a more
parsimonious model, in which all pathways between Level 1 and
Level 3 were constrained to equal 0. This parsimonious model
reflects the assumption that the effect of cognitive flexibility on
willingness to self-sacrifice is mediated completely via ideological
attachment in Level 2. This model also had good fit to the data
(χ2 = 20.431, df = 8, p = 0.009, n = 304, RMSEA = 0.071
[0.035, 0.109], SRMR = 0.056, CFI = 0.915, Yuan-Bentler scaling
correction factor = 1.063). A likelihood ratio test showed no
significant difference between the two models in terms of model
fit (1χ2 = 2.7014, 1df = 2, p = 0.2591), suggesting that the more
parsimonious model – in which there are no direct pathways
between Level 1 and Level 3, and so the variables in Level 2
possess a full mediatory role – is preferred.
This model accounted for 14.5% of the variance in willingness
to fight for the group and 33.5% of the variance in participants’
willingness to die for the national group. While WCST was
not a significant predictor of willingness to fight for the group,
its contribution approached significance (p = 0.10). To probe
this further, an SEM was fitted in which the pathway between
willingness to fight for the group and WCST was estimated freely
while the pathway between willingness to fight for the group and
RAT was constrained to equal 0. This suggested that WCST is
predictive of willingness to fight for the group (unstandardized
estimate = −5.629, SE = 2.890, standardized estimate = −0.149,
p = 0.051) but its variance is largely accounted for by RAT,
such that WCST performance is associated with willingness to
fight for the ingroup but does not predict above and beyond
RAT performance.
Additionally, we tested whether this model structure would
also predict participants’ behavior in the trolley dilemma,
however, the model was not an adequate fit to the data
[χ2 = 16.573, df = 8, p = 0.035, n = 304, RMSEA = 0.078
(0.020, 0.131), SRMR = 0.056, CFI = 0.815], primarily because
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willingness to fight for the group did not predict trolley dilemma
behavior (p = 0.884).
H3: Is Cognitive Inflexibility Related to Conviction in
Self Sacrifice?
We further examined the relationship between cognitive
flexibility and willingness to self-sacrifice for members of a
national ingroup by analyzing participants’ behavior in the trolley
dilemma. While there were no differences in the cognitive
flexibility of individuals who indicated that they would self-
sacrifice vs. save themselves in the trolley dilemma in terms of
WCST [F(1,205) = 0.098, p = 0.754] or RAT [F(1,294) = 0.815,
p = 0.367], the level of confidence in their decision to self-
sacrifice was related to cognitive flexibility. Specifically, amongst
participants who indicated that they would sacrifice themselves
to save 5 fellow British citizens, greater confidence in the decision
to self-sacrifice was related to reduced cognitive flexibility in the
WCST (r = −0.333, p = 0.011) and RAT (r = −0.217, p = 0.034).
Consequently, individuals with heightened conviction that they
would die for the group exhibited reduced cognitive flexibility
relative to individuals who were less confident in their decision
to self-sacrifice (see Figure 1). Notably, amongst participants
who chose to save themselves in the trolley dilemma, there were
no significant correlations between confidence in the decision
to save themselves and cognitive flexibility (WCST: r = −0.037,
p = 0.659; RAT: r =−0.087, p = 0.230). This suggest that cognitive
inflexibility is linked specifically to conviction in self sacrifice.
Interim Discussion
The results of Study 1 corroborate the three main hypotheses
and offer nuanced insights. Regarding H1, cognitive inflexibility
on both WCST and RAT was related to heightened willingness
to endorse violence against outgroups in order to protect
the ingroup (Table 1). Correlational analyses demonstrated
that willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the ingroup was
negatively correlated with RAT performance but not WCST
performance (Table 1). Structural equation models illustrated
that the two cognitive flexibility measures simultaneously
predicted willingness to endorse violence against outgroups,
and this in turn predicted willingness to sacrifice one’s life to
save ingroup members (Figure 2), corroborating H2. Lastly,
behavior on the hypothetical ingroup trolley dilemma revealed
that while there were no differences in cognitive inflexibility
according to whether participants opted for self-sacrifice or
self-preservation, greater confidence in the decision to self-
sacrifice was related to cognitive inflexibility (Figure 1),
supporting H3. This relationship was specific to the decision
to self-sacrifice and was absent in the decision to self-
preserve, suggesting that self-sacrificial tendencies possess unique
cognitive correlates.
STUDY 2 – UNITED STATES SAMPLE
Introduction
The objective of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study
1 and extend them to incorporate ideas and constructs from
identity fusion theory (Swann et al., 2009, 2012; Swann and
Buhrmester, 2015), which posits that a feeling of oneness and
identity fusion with the group facilitate pro-group actions and
self-sacrifice. Moreover, Study 2 aimed to investigate whether
endorsement of extreme pro-group actions was specifically
related to cognitive flexibility, or rather implicated several
cognitive traits. To this end, we incorporated an additional
FIGURE 1 | Correlations between cognitive flexibility (WCST and RAT) and participants’ confidence in their decision to sacrifice themselves for the group in a
hypothetical ingroup trolley dilemma.
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FIGURE 2 | Structural equation model predicting willingness to die for the group. All parameters shown are fully standardized. For unstandardized estimates, SEs,
and confidence intervals, see Supplementary Data. Significant parameter estimates are shown in red and green bolded lines. Residual covariances between
variables on the same level are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. Model controls for demographic variables (age, gender, and educational attainment).
Significance level was p < 0.05. ∗p = 0.10. L1, level 1; L2, level 2; and L3, level 3. Figure design was inspired by Kievit et al. (2016).
measure, the Alternative Uses Test, which indexes cognitive
flexibility as well as other cognitive constructs such as fluency,
elaboration, and originality. Study 2 therefore sought to
replicate H1 and H2, outlined in Study 1, and investigate two
additional hypotheses:
H4: Cognitive inflexibility is specifically implicated in
endorsement of violence against outgroups. Other cognitive
indices will be unrelated to willingness to fight outgroup
members to protect the ingroup.
H5: Cognitive inflexibility will predict self-sacrificial
tendencies through its effect on ideological attachment,
defined through the roles of identity fusion with the
ingroup and endorsement of violence against outgroups.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Procedure
In Study 2, we aimed to maximize power and so sought to
recruit 697 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1 to
achieve greater than 98% power to detect a medium effect
of r = 0.20 (according to Gignac and Szodorai, 2016, and
consistent with the findings of Study 1) at α = 0.001 in our
primary analyses of correlations between the cognitive variables
and the endorsement of extreme pro-group actions, calculated
using the pwr package in R (Champely et al., 2018). We
oversampled by 8% and recruited 750 participants, 7 of which
were excluded due to providing incomplete responses, yielding a
total sample of 743 participants. Participants were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk and redirected from these platforms
to an online survey hosted by Qualtrics Survey Software for
completion of all the self-reported items and the RAT, and later
redirected again to Inquisit 5 by Millisecond Software in order to
temporarily download software that allows for accurate measure
of performance and reaction times in the WCST. Participants
were asked about demographic variables such as age, ethnicity,
gender, and educational attainment. In the United States sample,
1www.mturk.com
the average age was 36.54 (SD = 13.45, range = 18 to 81), and
55.4% of participants were female (see Supplementary Table S2
for additional demographic characteristics). The research was
conducted with the ethical approval of Cambridge University’s
Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee. The
WCST, RAT, and willingness to fight and die for the group
were all measured in the same way as in Study 1, except with
the latter adapted to the United States sample such that items
were focused on the American citizens as the ingroup (e.g., “I
would fight someone physically threatening another American
person”). Furthermore, when administering the trolley dilemma,
participants were presented with the same scenario however, were
not asked to indicate their confidence about their decision. An
additional cognitive flexibility measure was included (Alternative
Uses Test, see below) and an additional measure of ideological
attachment was administered (Identity Fusion, see below).
Alternative Uses Test (AUT)
In this computerized version of the AUT (Guilford, 1967), two
common household items (brick and newspaper) were presented
each for 1.5 min. Participants were asked to generate as many
possible uses for these items. A timed clock was displayed to
participants showing them how much time they had left to
complete the task. The responses were analyzed by 4 different
measures, in accordance with convention (e.g., Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010; Madore et al., 2015; Zmigrod et al., 2015;
Addis et al., 2016): (1) fluency, the total number of appropriate
responses; (2) flexibility, the total number of distinct conceptual
categories in which the participant’s responses belonged; (3)
elaboration, the total amount of detail provided for each response
(response scored 0 for no details, scored 1 for multiple descriptive
words, scored 2 for detailed description of the object use); (4)
originality, the total number of original responses, defined as
responses that appear in less than 5% of the total responses (a
response was scored 0 if it was present in more than 5% of the
total sample’s responses, and response was scored 1 if present in
less than 5% of the sample’s responses). The responses were rated
and calculated by two independent raters.
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Identity Fusion
To measure participants’ feeling of attachment to their nation,
participants were presented with a validated measure of identity
fusion, the Dynamic Identity Fusion Index (DIFI; Jimenez et al.,
2016). The DIFI is a continuous pictorial representation that
allows participants to move a small circle representing “the self ”
by clicking and dragging it toward or away from a large circle
representing “the United States of America.” The amount of
overlap between the two circles has been shown to indicate
the extent to which individuals feel their personal identity
is fused with a collective identity (Jimenez et al., 2016). It
has temporal stability, as well as convergent and discriminant
validity (Jimenez et al., 2016), and has been previously used
to measure nationalistic attachment (e.g., Fredman et al., 2017;
Zmigrod et al., 2018a).
Results
Replicating H1: Is Cognitive Inflexibility Correlated
With Extremist Attitudes?
As in Study 1, performance on the WCST and RAT was
analyzed in relation to individuals’ support for extreme pro-
group actions. The correlational analysis replicated the significant
negative correlations between willingness to fight and kill out-
group members to protect the ingroup and cognitive flexibility
across both tasks observed in Study 1 (Table 1). The correlations
were also consistent for the additional cognitive flexibility task
included in Study 2 (the Alternative Uses Test), which was
also negatively correlated with support for extreme pro-group
actions. The correlations, which are remarkably similar across
both samples in Study 1 and 2, show that individuals who
were more willing to endorse violence were more cognitively
inflexible. Additionally, Study 2 tested for the relationships
between cognitive flexibility and nationalistic identity fusion.
There was a negative correlation between identity fusion and RAT
accuracy rate, but not with WCST or AUT performance.
H4: Is Cognitive Inflexibility a Specific Cognitive
Antecedent to Extremist Attitudes?
In order to test the specificity of cognitive flexibility, relative
to other aspects of cognition, in extremist attitudes, a 2-step
hierarchical linear regression analysis predicting willingness
to fight and kill for the ingroup was conducted (Table 2).
Participants who did not provide demographic information or
did not perform the AUT were omitted from this analysis,
leading to 636 participants. The first step of the regression
analysis consisted of demographic variables including gender,
educational attainment, and age. In the second step, the
four measures that can be extracted from AUT performance
were included: Flexibility, Fluency, Elaboration, and Originality.
The demographic variables in the first step generated a
significant model [F(3,632) = 13.686, p < 0.001], with
gender as a significant predictor of willingness to fight
others to protect the ingroup (p < 0.001) such that men
endorsed extreme pro-group actions to a greater extent than
women. The regression model was significantly improved
by the AUT measures [1F(4,628) = 7.187, p < 0.001]
with the AUT Flexibility serving as the only significant
TABLE 2 | Explaining willingness to fight for the group with performance on the
alternative uses task (AUT).
United States sample
Variable B [95% CI LB, UB] β t
Step 1
Gender 3.371 [2.313, 4.428] 0.242∗∗∗ 6.259
Educational attainment −0.370 [−0.772, 0.031] −0.071 −1.810
Age 0.016 [−0.024, 0.055] 0.031 0.793
1R2 = 0.061∗∗∗
Step 2
Gender 3.337 [2.284, 4.389] 0.240∗∗ 6.224
Educational attainment −0.332 [−0.730, 0.066] −0.063 −1.638
Age 0.015 [−0.024, 0.054] 0.029 0.742
AUT flexibility −0.882 [−1.350, −0.413] −0.180∗∗∗ −3.669
AUT fluency 0.008 [−0.371, 0.386] 0.003 0.039
AUT elaboration 0.127 [−0.121, 0.376] 0.043 1.004
AUT originality −0.188 [−0.621, 0.244] −0.060 −0.854
1R2 = 0.041∗∗∗
Overall R2 = 0.102
Adjusted R2 = 0.092
N = 636
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Results of hierarchical linear regression with willingness to fight for the group
regressed on educational attainment, age, and gender in the first step, and the
four dimensions of the alternative uses task entered in the second step.
predictor (p < 0.001). Overall, the regression model accounted
for 10.2% of the variance in willingness to fight for the
group. Cognitive flexibility may therefore have a considerable
and specific effect on individuals’ susceptibility to outgroup
violence endorsement.
H5: Does Cognitive Inflexibility Predict Violence
Endorsement Against Outgroups, Identity Fusion,
and Self-Sacrificial Tendencies?
As in Study 1, we used structural equation modeling to
investigate the extent to which cognitive inflexibility predicts (a)
willingness to fight for the group and (b) heightened identity
fusion, and whether these in turn predict (c) willingness to
sacrifice oneself for the group. We used the R package Lavaan
(Rosseel, 2012, 2017) to compute these models. A three-level
model was fitted to the data, in which Level 1 included
the three cognitive flexibility measures (WCST, RAT, and
AUT Flexibility), Level 2 consisted of willingness to fight
for the group and nationalistic identity fusion, and Level 3
reflected individuals’ willingness to sacrifice themselves for
their national group.
A model was tested in which willingness to self-sacrifice for
the group (Level 3) was directly predicted by the ideological
attachment variables in Level 2 as well as the cognitive flexibility
variables in Level 1. This model had excellent fit to the data
[χ2 = 18.397, df = 9, p = 0.031, n = 743, RMSEA = 0.037
(0.010, 0.062), SRMR = 0.024, CFI = 0.981, Yuan-Bentler scaling
correction factor = 0.996]. Next, we compared this model, in
which all pathways between the cognitive flexibility measures
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and willingness to self-sacrifice were estimated freely, to a more
parsimonious model, in which all pathways between Level 1
and Level 3 were set to equal 0. This parsimonious model
reflects the assumption that the effect of cognitive flexibility
on willingness to self-sacrifice is mediated completely via the
ideological attachment variables in Level 2. This model also
had excellent fit to the data [χ2 = 22.512, df = 12, p = 0.032,
n = 743, RMSEA = 0.034 (0.009, 0.056), SRMR = 0.026,
CFI = 0.978, Yuan-Bentler scaling correction factor = 0.977].
A likelihood ratio test showed no significant difference in
model fit between the two models (1χ2 = 4.211, 1df = 3,
p = 0.2396), and so the more parsimonious model – which
assumes that the ideological attachment variables in Level
2 fully mediate the relationships between Level 1 and 3 –
is preferred.
As evident in Figure 3, this model accounted for 29.3% of
the variance in willingness to sacrifice oneself for the group
(R2 = 29.0% when not controlling for demographic variables).
The model suggests that reduced cognitive flexibility contributes
toward heightened ideological attachment, and this in turn
predicts a greater willingness to sacrifice oneself to save the
life of a fellow American. Out of the three cognitive flexibility
measures, RAT negatively predicted nationalistic identity fusion,
such that lower scores on the RAT were related to greater
identity fusion. Furthermore, RAT and AUT Flexibility were the
strongest predictors of support for extreme pro-group actions,
and each made significant and complementary contributions
to the prediction of willingness to self-sacrifice. While WCST
was not a significant predictor of willingness to fight for the
group in this model, its contribution approached significance
(p = 0.087). To probe this further, an SEM was fitted in
which the pathway between support for extreme pro-group
actions and WCST was estimated freely while the pathways
between support for extreme pro-group actions and the other
cognitive flexibility measures (RAT and AUT) were constrained
to 0. This suggested that WCST is predictive of support
for extreme pro-group actions (unstandardized estimate = -
8.066, SE = 2.357, standardized estimate = -0.182, p = 0.001)
but its variance is accounted for by the other cognitive
flexibility measures.
Additionally, control analyses were conducted in order to
evaluate the models’ hierarchical structure and to establish
that the fit of these models was not due to a general
feature of the variable covariance matrix. We fitted a model
in which Level 1 and Level 2 were reversed, such that
willingness to self-sacrifice was predicted by cognitive rigidity,
which in turn were predicted by endorsement of extreme
pro-group actions and identity fusion. Consequently, this
control model included the same information as the original
model (depicted in Figure 3), and possessed equivalent
complexity, but assumes a different structural relationship
between the variables. Pathways between willingness to self-
sacrifice and endorsement of extreme pro-group actions
and identity fusion were constrained to zero. The original
model fit the data significantly better than the inverted
model (1AIC = 285.764).
To validate and extend this model further, we fitted the
original parsimonious model (Figure 4) to participants’ behavior
on the trolley problem. Specifically, we examined whether
this model structure would predict individuals’ willingness to
sacrifice themselves in the trolley problem. To deal with this
dichotomous outcome variable, the structural equation model
was specified such that diagonally weighted least squares were
used to estimate the model parameters, but the full weight
FIGURE 3 | Structural equation model predicting willingness to sacrifice oneself for the group. All parameters shown are fully standardized. For unstandardized
estimates, SEs, and confidence intervals, see Supplementary Data. Significant parameter estimates are shown in red and green bolded lines. Residual covariances
between variables on the same level are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. Model controls for demographic variables (age, gender, and educational attainment).
Significance level was p < 0.05. ∗p = 0.087. L1, level 1; L2, level 2; and L3, level 3. Figure design was inspired by Kievit et al. (2016).
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FIGURE 4 | Structural equation model predicting willingness to sacrifice oneself in the trolley problem All parameters shown are fully standardized. For
unstandardized estimates, SEs, and confidence intervals, see Supplementary Data. Significant parameter estimates are shown in red and green bolded lines.
Residual covariances between variables on the same level are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. Model controls for demographic variables (age, gender,
educational attainment). Significance level was p < 0.05. ∗p = 0.062. L1, level 1; L2, level 2; and L3, level 3. Figure design was inspired by Kievit et al. (2016).
matrix was used to compute robust standard errors and
mean- and variance-adjusted test statistics (see Rosseel, 2017).
This model was an excellent fit to the data [χ2 = 12.399,
df = 12, p = 0.414, n = 743, RMSEA = 0.010 (0.000,
0.057), SRMR = 0.028, CFI = 0.998, Scaling correction
factor = 1.002, Shift parameter for simple second-order
correction = 0.539].
As manifest in Figure 4, this model accounted for 12.7%
of the variance in participants’ decision to sacrifice themselves
for the group in the trolley problem (R2 = 12.2% when not
controlling for demographic variables). This model suggests that
cognitive inflexibility predicts heightened support for extreme
pro-group actions and identity fusion, which in turn predict
willingness to self-sacrifice in the trolley problem. Notably, all
three measures of cognitive flexibility were significant predictors
of support for extreme pro-group actions in this model, with each
making independent and complementary contributions. With
regards to identity fusion, RAT was a significant predictor, and
AUT Flexibility’s predictive contribution approached significance
(p = 0.062). We examined whether a less parsimonious
model in which the pathways between Level 1 and Level
3 are estimated freely would have better model fit to the
data. While the model fit was also excellent [χ2 = 11.749,
df = 9, p = 0.228, n = 743, RMSEA = 0.030 (0.000,
0.073), SRMR = 0.028, CFI = 0.984, Scaling correction
factor = 1.043, Shift parameter for simple second-order
correction = 0.373], a likelihood ratio test revealed that
allowing these pathways to be estimated freely did not
significantly improve model fit (1χ2 = 0.0463, 1df = 3,
p = 0.9974) and so the more parsimonious model presented in
Figure 4 was preferred.
Interim Discussion
Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1, in a United States
participant sample, by corroborating the relationship between
willingness to endorse violence against outgroups to protect the
ingroup and cognitive inflexibility and (Table 1), supporting
H1. It also extended the findings of Study 1 by replicating this
effect in a third, independent measure of cognitive flexibility,
the Alternative Uses Test, and illustrating that cognitive
inflexibility was specifically implicated in outgroup violence
endorsement, as other cognitive indices regarding verbal fluency,
elaboration, and originality, were not implicated (Table 2),
supporting H4. As in Study 1, WCST performance was not
significantly correlated with willingness to self-sacrifice, while
the correlation with RAT approached significance (p = 0.069),
offering some support to Study 1. In contrast, the AUT
flexibility score was significantly related to willingness to self-
sacrifice (Table 1), suggesting that perhaps different facets
of flexibility are differentially related to these psycho-social
processes. Lastly, in support of H2 and H5, cognitive inflexibility
predicted willingness to fight for one’s ingroup as well as
ingroup identity fusion, which jointly predicted self-sacrificial
tendencies in self-report measures and the trolley dilemma
scenario (Figures 3, 4).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Rigid ideological thinking and the inflexible categorization of
“us” and “them” that underlie a willingness to harm out-
group members for the sake of the ingroup were hypothesized
to be related to domain-general cognitive rigidity. Across all
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statistical analyses, in over 1,000 participants from both the
United Kingdom (Study 1) and the United States (Study
2), cognitive inflexibility predicted willingness to fight and
harm others to protect the national ingroup, which in turn
predicted a willingness to die for the group. Indeed, across
both samples, structural equation modeling suggested that the
relationship between cognitive inflexibility and willingness to
self-sacrifice was fully mediated via the role of ideological
attachment (Figures 2, 3). These models accounted for 33.5%
of the variance in willingness to die for the group in the
United Kingdom sample and 29.3% of the variance in the
United States sample. Notably, these patterns were consistent
when self-sacrificial tendencies were also evaluated with an
ingroup trolley dilemma scenario in which participants indicated
whether they would jump to their deaths to save five fellow
citizens or save themselves (Figure 4). Cognitive inflexibility
predicted ideological attachment, which in turn predicted trolley
problem sacrifice decisions, accounting for 12.7% of the variance
in the binary self-sacrifice decision. In the United Kingdom
sample, participants also indicated their level of confidence
in their decision to self-sacrifice vs. self-preservation. Greater
conviction in the decision to self-sacrifice was related to
cognitive inflexibility across both tasks (Figure 1). Moreover,
analysis of performance on the AUT revealed that cognitive
flexibility – distinctly from other aspects of cognition such as
fluency, elaboration, and originality – was specifically implicated
as a cognitive antecedent of ideological attachment and self-
sacrifice (Table 2).
Humans have a tendency to categorize people into distinct
social groups and to enforce rigid boundaries between “us” and
“them.” While this simplification is computationally cheap, it also
enforces rigidity and can facilitate failures in intergroup empathy
that ultimately enable people to inflict harm on outgroups (for
review see: Cikara and Van Bavel, 2014). Despite the general
tendency toward rigid social categorization, individuals differ in
their emphasis on “us” vs. “them” distinctions and consequently
in their willingness to harm others and sacrifice themselves
in the defense of their ingroup. Here we find that individuals
with heightened willingness to support outgroup violence also
exhibit heightened cognitive inflexibility in non-ideological,
behavioral cognitive tasks. This supports the hypothesis that
a general rigidity in evaluation of stimuli translates into a
rigidity in assessments of social groups, and this facilitates a
proclivity toward ideological outgroup violence endorsement
and self-sacrifice. The way in which the mind processes and
responds to non-ideological stimuli may therefore reflect the
manner in which it evaluates ideological group identities and
the permissiveness of inflicting harm on anonymous outgroup
members in defense of one’s ingroup.
These findings illustrate that cognitive factors – and not
purely emotional or motivational processes – shape endorsement
of extreme pro-group actions, such as harming others and
self-sacrificing for the group. The results are consistent with
other findings that cognitive inflexibility is associated with
ideological commitment to conservatism (Van Hiel et al., 2016;
Jost, 2017), political extremism (Zmigrod et al., unpublished
at JEP:G), nationalism (Zmigrod et al., 2018a), and religion
(Zmigrod et al., 2018b). Cognitive inflexibility has also been
shown to relate to lack of intellectual humility (the awareness
that one’s evaluation of information and decision-making may
be biased or flawed; Zmigrod et al., 2019). Cognitive dispositions
may therefore need to be incorporated into prominent theories
about the factors shaping extremism and self-sacrifice, such as
significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014) identity fusion
theory (Swann et al., 2010, 2012), and even the social identity
model of collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). This will
facilitate research into the neural mechanisms that underlie these
psycho-social processes.
An example of how these cognitive findings may inform
and complement the neuroscience of intergroup relations
and radicalization may reside in the recent findings by
Pretus et al. (2018, current Special Issue), showing that
neural activity associated with processing of sacred values is
heightened in brain regions implicated in rule retrieval amongst
individuals susceptible to radicalization. Given that cognitive
inflexibility in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test measured here
is operationalized in terms of difficulty in adapting to changes
in rules, and left inferior frontal areas have in fact also been
implicated in cognitive inflexibility processes (Konishi et al.,
1998; Kim et al., 2011), it may be that these neural findings
are partially explained by the rigidity of behavioral rules often
imposed by sacred values and extremist ideologies. Future
empirical work will need to elucidate whether cognitive rigidity
and cognitive control processes mediate the relationship between
susceptibility to radicalization and neural risk factors.
To our knowledge, this is the first study suggesting that strong
ingroup loyalty and sacrifice are not purely underpinned by
“hot”emotional processing, attitude-confirming biases, or moral
foundations and values. Here it is shown that people’s willingness
to harm others for their group may also be rooted in “cold”
emotionally neutral cognitive information processing tendencies
toward strict categorical thinking and preferences for systematic,
persisting rules for thought and behavior. Future research on
the psychological roots of radicalization and extremist attitudes
will need to address how non-emotional cognitive styles interact
with other individual-level motivational risk factors such as the
quest for personal significance (Kruglanski et al., 2014), identity
fusion (Swann et al., 2010; Whitehouse, 2018), the need to belong
(Littman and Paluck, 2015; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015), social
dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Duckitt
and Sibley, 2010), and sacred values (Atran, 2010; Ginges, 2019).
While the present study involved two large samples and
a replication of effects, it was constrained to two Western
samples, and so further work is needed in other cultural
contexts. This is especially important given findings of cultural
differences in responses to trolley dilemma problems (Gold
et al., 2014a) and the need to make psychological science
more demographically and culturally representative (Rad et al.,
2018). Additionally, it has been shown that stereotype content
shapes endorsement of violence against outgroups and behavior
in hypothetical footbridge dilemmas (Cikara et al., 2010)
and so it will be essential for future work to incorporate
outgroup stereotype content into models of the psychology
and neuroscience of radicalization susceptibility. Moreover,
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we introduced here a novel means of testing conviction in
self-sacrifice – by measuring participants’ confidence in their
decisions to self-sacrifice in a hypothetical trolley dilemma
scenario in order to save the lives of ingroup members. We
hope that this will contribute to the methodological discussions
surrounding the use of trolley problem dilemmas (e.g., Gold
et al., 2014b, 2015; Graham et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2017)
and offer a valuable means of subtly testing precursor attitudes
toward extremism.
The results are also important due to their implications
for future understanding and intervention. Future research will
need to investigate the interactions between trait and state
cognitive flexibility in relation to endorsement of violence
against out-groups; for instance, does strong commitment to
an ideological group reduce cognitive flexibility? Developmental
studies will be necessary in order to elucidate causal links
and self-reinforcing loops between cognitive rigidity and out-
group violence endorsement. Moreover, cognitive rigidity may
help illuminate the moral logic to reasoning about political
violence (Ginges, 2019) and the reasons individuals kill and
die for abstract causes. From a prevention perspective, perhaps
teaching children and citizens in vulnerable communities to be
more cognitively flexible (Diamond and Lee, 2011) would have
broader consequences for their tolerance and appetite for conflict
than purely targeting their discriminatory attitudes. The finding
that cognitive information processing styles are predictive of
extremist attitudes should motivate social and political scientists,
policymakers, and intervention scientists, to incorporate the
objective methodologies of cognitive science in order to construct
a more comprehensive picture of the vulnerability factors for
extreme and radicalized behavior.
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